“ … Originally the first Cyclone was due early 2009, but in 2008 and in 2009 Sikorsky claimed schedule relief for “excusable delays.” Then in late November just weeks before the first test Cyclones were expected, Sikorsky gave notice of another delay.”
http://www.metronews.ca/halifax/local/article/724378–sea-kings-make-way-for-cyclones
Auditor General Sheila Fraser’s Fall Report on Canadian Military helicopter procurement peeled the covers of the procurement of a militarized version of the S-92. Just after she issued this report, the media discovered that the latest deadline was going to be blown as well (see later posts).
CBC – Auditor General Fraser slams chopper buys
http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2010/10/26/auditor-general-report.html
Postmedia News: AG ‘troubled’ by cost overruns, delays in helicopter purchases
http://www.canada.com/news/troubled+cost+overruns+delays+helicopter+purchases/3728982/story.html
Key findings of the Auditor General of Canada:
(Full report found here and online at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201010_06_e_34289.html)
o “Changes in contract provisions are not consistent with the procurement strategy.”
CBC’s The Fifth Estate has found that the maker of a helicopter that crashed near Newfoundland a year ago, killing 17 people, knew more than six months earlier about the gearbox problem that downed the chopper.
The CBC investigation also revealed that U.S. and Canadian aviation safety organizations knew about theSikorsky helicopter’s flaw in August 2008.
On March 12, 2009, Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 slammed into the Atlantic Ocean 55 kilometres southeast of St. John’s. Both pilots and 15 passengers died, leaving one survivor: Robert Decker, 28.
The S92 chopper, made by U.S.-based Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., was ferrying workers to offshore oil-production platforms hundreds of kilometres east of St. John’s.
It crashed minutes after the pilots reported the helicopter was losing oil pressure.
It was later determined the crash happened after oil leaked from the chopper’s main gearbox, an integral part of the system that turns the helicopter’s main rotors.
“Sikorsky should have been paying attention to this,” said Shawn Coyle, who used to work for Transport Canada as a helicopter test pilot and now works as a consultant to the industry. “Someone in Sikorsky’s organization should have been watching for this sort of thing.”
On March 20, just over a week after the crash, Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigators saidbroken bolts, or studs, securing the oil filter mount to the main gearbox on the helicopter were suspect.
“We went public after we were told by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and by Sikorsky that they were planning on taking action,” said the TSB’s Mike Cunningham. “We wanted to make sure that all the operators, worldwide, of S92s got that information in the quickest manner possible.”
Less than two weeks after the crash, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration ? the organization that had certified the Sikorsky S92 as safe to fly ? grounded all of the choppers and ordered their owners to change titanium studs to steel studs.
It may appear they reacted quickly, but The Fifth Estate’s investigation questions that conclusion. The CBCinvestigation shows that during the summer of 2008, Sikorsky, TSB and the FAA were aware of the possibility of the titanium studs breaking.
On July 2, 2008, a Sikorsky S92 chopper carrying Australian offshore oil industry workers narrowly avoided tragedy after two studs securing the oil-filter assembly to the main gearbox broke and the helicopter lost oil pressure. The pilots were close enough to land to bring the chopper down safely.
Claimed to be safest
The mechanical failure left some people in the helicopter transportation industry with questions about the S92 ? a helicopter Sikorskyadvertised as the safest in the world.The Australian helicopter was owned by CHC Helicopter Corp. of Vancouver. CHC asked Transportation Safety Board of Canada’s West Coast manager, Bill Yearwood, to oversee an independent analysis of what happened to that chopper.
That crucial third-party analysis took place in Richmond, B.C., in the presence of the helicopter’s owners and Sikorsky officials.
An Aug. 29, 2008, summary of that examination written by the TSB noted some troubling findings.
“There appears to be several unresolved issues with the oil system, aside from the fractured studs, on this particular aircraft. It seems likely that these issues are related to stud failures,” the TSB found.
The TSB also noted that: “It is reported the military S92s use steel studs to attach the filter bowl to the transmission.”
FAA told in 2008
In late August of 2008, the TSB advised the FAA of its findings.But it wasn’t until five months later ? on Jan. 28, 2009 ? that Sikorsky issued an alert saying the titanium mounting studs should be replaced by steel studs on every helicopter within a year, or within 1,250 flight hours.
Two months after that, on March 23, 2009 ? more than seven months after the Australian chopper failure ? that the FAA grounded the S92s and ordered the studs changed.
The Fifth Estate ‘s Linden MacIntyre asked Coyle about the time it took authorities and Sikorsky to respond to what they learned in August 2008.
“You tell me, is that a reasonable lapse of time?” he asked.
“Well, in hindsight, no,” said Coyle.
Neither the FAA nor Transport Canada agreed to on-camera interviews requested by The Fifth Estate. Sikorsky also declined repeated requests for an on-camera interview.
The Fifth estate will be airing a special episode this Friday (March 12) at 9:00pm to commemorate the 1 year anniversary of the crash.
Keith Kenny didn’t worry too much when he climbed aboard the helicopter that would shuttle him out to his job on one of Newfoundland’s offshore installations.
He would settle into the back of the Sikorsky S-92 and fall asleep for the roughly two-hour ride as he had many times for the last several years.
But when one of the helicopters crashed a year ago killing 17 people, Kenny’s sense of ease quickly evaporated while attention turned to thesafety of the aircraft flying workers to the platforms and the regime that oversees the lucrative industry.
In particular, observers, experts and employees said the crash of Cougar Flight 491 highlighted the need for a separate safety agency to replace an offshore regulator that has the competing tasks of promoting the industry and protecting workers.
Kenny, who lost friends and his niece in the crash last March 12, argues that Newfoundland’s offshore regulator is in a clear conflict and might not be able to both advocate on behalf of the industry while ensuring worker safety.
“Things have to change,” the 45-year-old galley steward said from his home in Fermeuse, one of the small communities along the Avalon Peninsula’s eastern coast that lost nine people in the accident.
“Are they protecting the companies more than they are the workers? Who knows, but hopefully now everyone will do right.”
The difficult question is a central one being asked about the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, the arms-length regulator that has both safety and resource management as two of its four mandates.
Critics have voiced concerns before about the dual _ and, they suggest, duelling _ roles the board plays in regulating the industry.
But those questions came into sharper focus at an inquiry called in the wake of the crash of the S-92, which went down suddenly after experiencing mechanical problems on its way to the offshore.
The province’s federation of labour testified at the inquiry led by Robert Wells that there should be a separate agency dealing strictly with worker safety.
“We must understand the competing interests of safety and production or profit and put in place the correct structures,” federation president Lana Payne said at the inquiry.
“What we have in the offshore is not much better than self-regulation.”
The former leader of the union representing hundreds of offshore oil workers echoed the sentiment, saying there have been calls for an overhaul of the regulatory framework since the Ocean Ranger drilling rig went down in 1982, killing all 84 people aboard.
“The board is the promoter and cheerleader of the industry in developing the offshore while at the same time they’re also protecting thesafety of the people _ that’s certainly a conflict,” said Sheldon Peddle of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers union.
“There may be some things that aren’t done to the fullest on the safety side so as not to impact the development offshore.”
Sean Kelly, a spokesman with the C-NLOPB, said the board won’t comment on the matter while Wells was still working on his report.
But experts in the area say there appears to be a move by some nations involved in the offshore to separate the two responsibilities into different bodies.
Magne Ognedal, director of the Petroleum Safety Authority in Norway, said the Norwegian government decided in 2004 to split safety and resource management into different agencies.
As head of the safety group, he oversees risk issues, accident prevention and safety concerns in the work environment.
“It was to avoid possible conflict between resource management and safety issues,” he said from Stavanger, Norway. “The roles have been much clearer and the safety part of it all stands out with better authority …
“We don’t have to think about possible consequences for resource management.”
Other big players in the offshore, including the United Kingdom and Australia, have also divided the areas.
Critics of the current Canadian framework have accused the petroleum board of moving slowly in forcing industry to improve safety.
Randell Earle, the lawyer for the unionized offshore workers, said at the inquiry that the board “dropped the ball” in communicating to employees through their occupational health and safety committees or making improvements to safety devices, such as underwater breathing devices.
It took nine years to introduce underwater breathing devices offshore.
He said board safety specialists failed to find a way to implement a recommendation of the Ocean Ranger inquiry report that required a full-time, dedicated search and rescue helicopter near the offshore oilfields.
The board was also accused of failing to act promptly in fixing problems with workers’ survival suits.
The board’s chief safety officer, Howard Pike, testified that the board had heard complaints about the suits before the crash but wasn’t able to make any headway with the problem.
Jack Harris, an NDP MP with standing at the inquiry, said commission counsel are visiting the U.K. and other jurisdictions to look into the issue of whether to recommend a separation of the responsibilities.
“A different structure would allow a focus strictly on safety,” he said. “You do need something totally separate on the safety side.”
Wells has already recommended that a helicopter be on standby to respond to an emergency within 20 minutes. He has also called for a temporary ban on night flights offshore until a search-and-rescue helicopter is equipped to carry out rescues after dark.
The board has accepted those recommendations.
Harold Mullowney, whose brother Derek was killed, said he’s encouraged by those actions. But he cautions that there is much to be done to increase safety in a valued, but risky industry that employs about 3,400 people in Newfoundland on and offshore.
“It’s hard to serve two masters _ you have to be there for one or the other, you can’t do both,” he said of the board.
“We say there’s costs (to safety), but I don’t buy that. If you’re into a multibillion-dollar business, you don’t treat humans as if they were machinery. You treat them as human beings.”
One year has passed since the tragic crash: many questions about SAR have yet to be resolved.
An interfaith service will be held in St. John’s Friday to mark the one-year anniversary of the Cougar helicopter crash.
Seventeen of the 18 people aboard Cougar Flight 491 died on March 12, 2009, when their chopper plummeted into the ocean. The chopper went down after its crew reported severe mechanical difficulties.
Cougar Helicopters said Tuesday that an ecumenical service will be held at the Roman Catholic Basilica at 7 p.m. The public is invited to attend.
“As we remember those who were lost on March 12th, let us embrace and care for those left behind with broken hearts,” Cougar said in a statement.
“Let us also care for a greater community that mourns. Let us all come together to remember.”
The ecumenical service is being organized through Ezra Chaplaincy Services.
Howard Pike, chief safety officer for the offshore regulator, faces questioning this morning from Randell Earle, the lawyer for unionized offshore workers.
It’s the last day of public hearings for the Wells inquiry into offshore helicopter safety. The inquiry will move into its investigative phase as the inquiry commissioner Robert Wells and inquiry lawyers consult with other offshore safety regulators and examine research studies.
Wells must deliver a report by Sept. 30.
The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB) established the inquiry following the March 12 helicopter crash that killed 17 offshore workers and pilots.
When the Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the cause of the crash, delivers its report, the inquiry will begin Phase 2. Wells will review the TSB report and make further recommendations.
Howard Pike, chief safety officer with the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, prepares to testify at the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry in St. John’s Wednesday. – Photo by Joe Gibbons/The Telegram
Inquiry Inquiry commissioner checking on jurisdiction regarding equipment safety
The lawyer for the families of the pilots of Cougar Helicopter Flight 491 have raised questions Wednesday about the safety equipment used by helicopter pilots flying offshore.
Kate O’Brien wants to know how equipment – such as immersion suits and helmets – is tested and certified for use by pilots in the offshore oil industry.
So far, she said, no witness at the Wells Inquiry into offshore helicopter safety has been able to provide that information.
On Wednesday, Howard Pike, the chief safety officer of the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB), said Transport Canada is the lead regulator for helicopter operations in the offshore oil industry.
That didn’t satisfy O’Brien.
“I’m hoping that the CNLOPB will find a way, or this commission of inquiry will find a way, to exercise some clout to ensure … that kind of rigour is put into the system,” she told reporters.
O’Brien said she was pleased to hear inquiry commissioner Robert Wells say he’ll see if he has any jurisdiction to look into this further.
The Wells Inquiry was established following the March 12, 2009, helicopter crash that killed 15 offshore workers and two pilots. One man survived.
O’Brien said the CNLOPB requires oil companies to use survival suits for offshore workers that exceed regulatory standards.
They must also demonstrate those suits protect workers from hypothermia – as was the case following a June 2009 request by the board. It resulted in a series of tests last summer in simulated ocean conditions.
O’Brien wants the same standards and testing for immersion suits worn by pilots.
“Those suits might be fine – I don’t know,” she told reporters. “Nobody has done the testing yet in terms of any evidence I’ve seen, and I really think that that testing should be done.”
O’Brien asked if Pike could make a similar request to test helicopter pilot suits.
“That would certainly be pushing our boundary in what I see is our jurisdiction, so I’d have to review that one with my (legal) counsel in order to see whether we could do anything,” he said. “But, on the surface, I’d have to say no.”
O’Brien replied, “It’s not just for the safety of the pilots, though I think that’s very important, too, … but it’s also important for the rest of the workers.” “The safety of one is important to all.”
Cougar Helicopters flies offshore workers to and from the oilfields off Newfoundland and Labrador.
When Cougar executives testified earlier this month, O’Brien said, she was surprised to learn the company’s pilots are not required to wear helmets.
Rick Burt, general manager of Cougar, said some pilots wear them, others do not.
“Mr. Burt conceded that it’s safer to wear a helmet than to not wear a helmet, but yet he had some concerns as to whether helmets might be heavy, uncomfortable,” O’Brien said.
Burt also said the company didn’t do a formal risk assessment on helmets, though he acknowledged it would be a good idea.
“We really need someone to look into this and ensure that … companies that are so critical such as Cougar to the safety of everyone who travels offshore are actually practising what they’re preaching,” O’Brien said.
Pike also outlined the CNLOPB’s database for recording helicopter incidents – citing examples to show how the board deals with those incidents and carries out audits of helicopter operations.
The database contains 31 helicopter incidents dating to 1988.
On Oct. 11, 2009, there was a report of a weight distribution problem during a flight to the Hibernia platform.
As the helicopter was about to land at the platform, passengers were asked to get out of their seats and move forward to balance weight in the cargo hold.
That incident is under review by the CNLOPB.
“We wanted a closer look at the root cause … so it’s still being discussed,” Pike said.
Another incident occurred Dec. 16, 2001, at the Terra Nova oilfield – triggering a safety audit of helicopter operations.
“A worker was transported within the field without a flight suit,” Pike said.
Flight suits – also known as survival suits – are required to be worn by all passengers during helicopter flights offshore. Instead, the employee was wearing workclothes and a red jacket.
The passenger travelled from the diving support ship Kommander 2000 to the drill rig Henry Goodrich within the Terra Nova oilfield.
The flight lasted five minutes or less.
“The pilot made a judgment call that the risk of flying the passenger to the Henry Goodrich was less than the risk of landing back on the Kommander,” Pike said. “In hindsight, this was not the decision that should have been made.”
He also said the pilot should not have had to make such a judgment call.
“He shouldn’t have been put in that position.”
Pike said changes were made to the passenger list for that flight, resulting in one person not having a survival suit.
He said Petro-Canada (now known as Suncor Energy), which operates the Terra Nova field, made its existing policy clearer on the use of survival suits during all flights.
The incident was investigated and closed. In 2002, the board audited Petro-Canada on its helicopter operations offshore.
The inquiry resumes today with the CNLOPB.
The chief safety officer for the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB) told the Wells inquiry its database contains 31 helicopter incidents dating back to 1988.
Howard Pike said some have been added since his last appearance before the inquiry in October.
Pike used some examples from that database to show how the board deals with incidents and carries out audits of helicopter operations.
One recent incident was an Oct. 11, 2009, report of a weight distribution problem during a flight to the Hibernia platform.
As the helicopter was about to land at the platform, passengers were asked to get out of their seats and move to the front of the aircraft to adjust the weight balance.
That incident is still under review by the CNLOPB.
“It’s still open,” said Pike. “We wanted a closer look at the root-cause … so it’s still being discussed.”
Another incident occurred Dec. 16, 2001, at the Terra Nova oilfield — triggering a safety audit of helicopter operations. It was one of four audits of helicopter operations done by the CNLOPB since 2000.
“A worker was transported within the field without a flight suit,” said Pike.
Flight suits — also known as survival suits — are required to be worn by all passengers during helicopter flights offshore.
At the time, a passenger travelled from the diving support ship Kommander 2000 to the drill rig Henry Goodrich within the Terra Nova oilfield.
The flight lasted five minutes or less.
“The flight crew was aware that the individual was not suitably attired for helicopter flight over open water,” said Pike.
“The pilot made a judgment call that the risk of flying the passenger to the Henry Goodrich was less than the risk of landing back on the Kommander. In hindsight, this was not the decision that should have been made.”
Pike said the pilot should not have had to make that judgment call in the first place.
“He was put in a very difficult position and he shouldn’t have been put in that position.”
Pike said changes were made to the passenger list for that flight, resulting in one person not having a survival suit.
He said Petro-Canada (now known as Suncor Energy), which operates the Terra Nova field, made its existing policy clearer on the use of survival suits during flights.
“There’s now a very clear directive from Petro-Canada that no passenger should be transported without wearing a transportation suit.”
The December incident was also report late to the CNLOPB — not until Jan. 14, 2002.
Pike said the incident investigation was closed four days after it was reported.
In 2002, the board audited Petro-Canada on its helicopter operations offshore.
Mark from the Torch just wrote a great piece!
New (someday) maritime helicopter: Cyclone deliveries continue to go counter-clockwise
Some two months ago:CH-148 Cyclones: There are delays and then there are, er, delays
A “slight delay” in the process of making a less-than-fully capable helicopter operational. Whoopee!From August 2009:
Cyclone still forming: Now we’ll have “interim maritime helicopters”
And now:
SLIGHT DELAY IN CYCLONE MARITIME HELICOPTER SEA TRIALS BUT TESTS TO START IN JANUARY GOVERNMENT CONFIRMSSea trials for the new Cyclone helicopter will take place before the end of January on the east coast, Defence Watch has been told…
Today’s ridiculous reality that is certainly no laughing matter:
Sikorsky faces more setbacks in delivery of new helicoptersManufacturer unable to live up to revised deal signed in 2008, which would see initial delivery of 28 helicopters this year
There is one more twist in the seemingly never-ending saga of the replacement of Canada’s Sea King helicopters.
More than a year after announcing a four-year delay in the long-running project, Sikorsky has just acknowledged that it is facing another setback in the delivery of the first of 28 aircraft.
Details are scarce, but Sikorsky is saying it can’t live up to the new schedule that was negotiated with Ottawa 14 months ago, and is unlikely to offer all of the promised equipment in the first round of deliveries.
“Sikorsky has advised the government of Canada of potential delays, and we’re working to assess the implications of these potential delays,” said Chris Hilton, a spokesman for Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose.
According to the initial contract signed in 2004, the Canadian Forces were to begin receiving fully compliant Cyclone CH-148s within four years, by 2008…
The sea trials ain’t started either. Here’s the prime reason for this total balls-up, from a December 2008 post:
…
Canada, under the Liberals for political reasons (i.e. no more EH101s, not that that aircraft turned out that well, more here), bought a military version of a civilian helicopter that no other country has yet bought–and it’s only just flown for the first time! Contract didn’t work out too well, did it? So now we’re eating the costs because there’s nothing else to do. But don’t forget the Conservative government has promised to improve defence procurement (from Update at link):
The Speech from the Throne also said this about defence procurement:
Fixing procurement will be a top priority. Simpler and streamlined processes will make it easier for businesses to provide products and services to the government and will deliver better results for Canadians. Military procurement in particular is critical: Canada cannot afford to have cumbersome processes delay the purchase and delivery of equipment needed by our men and women in uniform.I answer: “Oink!” (with the CF now promoting rooting themselves). More on the Cyclone debacle here, where I wrote:
There should be a formal investigation, with the results made public, into how Sikorsky won the competition [lots of pork–“Benefits for all Canadians”]–and into the subsequent management of the project. I think it disgraceful that the Liberal government of Paul Martin, the CF, and Public Works chose in 2004 to buy a paper aircraft–that still has no other buyer, an aircraft that in reality simply could not meet the contract’s terms without major changes to the original specifications of the machine…As far as I can see the Conservative government still in fact has done nothing concrete to improve or streamline procurement. Some “top priority”. Shame on them. And I don’t think the coming budget crunch will help things much.
Media: S-92 Crash
S-92 Facts 